Protecting the innovator, not only the innovation the antitrust assement of innovation maverick acquisitions
Contenido principal del artículo
Resumen
This paper explores the antitrust assessment of innovation maverick acquisitions, a category of firms that continuously introduce new products, technologies, or business models, disrupting markets and driving competitors to innovate. While price mavericks have traditionally been the focus of antitrust analysis, innovation mavericks pose distinct challenges and may have a deeper impact on market dynamics. The acquisition of innovation mavericks may result in reduction of innovation efforts in the future of both the merging parties and across the market. The paper highlights the inadequacy of traditional antitrust framework, which tends to focus on price competition, and argues for the adoption of a new approach. By doing so, antitrust authorities can not only prevent collusion but also promote long-term innovation incentives, ensuring that industries remain competitive and innovative. This paper takes the first step toward developing a framework for assessing innovation maverick acquisitions, emphasizing the importance of dynamic efficiencies and innovation competition.
Descargas
Detalles del artículo
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
Citas
BAKER, Jonathan B.; Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects under the Antitrust Laws. New York University Law Review, v. 77, n. 135, p. 135-203, apr. 2002. Available at: https://www.nyulawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/NYULawReview-77-1-Baker.pdf. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
BAUMOL, William; ORDOVER Janusz. Antitrust: Source of Dynamic and Static Inefficiencies? In: JORDE, Thomas M.; TEECE, David J. Antitrust, Innovation, and Competitiveness. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
BRASIL. Lei n.º 12.529, de 30 de novembro de 2011. Estrutura o Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência; dispõe sobre a prevenção e repressão às infrações contra a ordem econômica; altera a Lei no 8.137, de 27 de dezembro de 1990, o Decreto-Lei no 3.689, de 3 de outubro de 1941 - Código de Processo Penal, e a Lei no 7.347, de 24 de julho de 1985; revoga dispositivos da Lei no 8.884, de 11 de junho de 1994, e a Lei no 9.781, de 19 de janeiro de 1999; e dá outras providências. Brasília-DF: Presidência da República. Disponível em: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2011/lei/l12529.htm. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
BRASIL. Ministério da Justiça. Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica. Guide for Horizontal Merger Review, jul. 2016, p. 47. Disponível em: https://cdn.cade.gov.br/Portal/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/guias-do-cade/Guide-forHorizontal-Merger-Review.pdf. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
BRASIL. Ministério da Justiça. Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica. Superintendência-Geral do CADE. Coordenação-Geral de Análise Antitruste 1. Parecer Técnico n. 138 – Caso 08700.010688/2013-83. Disponível em: https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_documento_consulta_externa.php?xgSJHD3TI7Rh0CrGYtJb0A1Onc6JnUmZgGFW0zP7uM_isGtU22-m8ewnOSdIvPHyVwcJSMOFbxNuj32YrsONkpOrH_83hgsRJtNlaBxWRPhirly8vGwO2ryQ0bs3EGh. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
BRASIL. Ministério da Justiça e da Segurança Pública. Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE). Anexo ao Parecer Técnico no. 24 – Processo 08700.004431/2017-16. Available at: https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_documento_consulta_externa.php?xgSJHD3TI7Rh0CrGYtJb0A1Onc6JnUmZgGFW0zP7uM_isGtU22-m8ewnOSdIvPHyVwcJSMOFbxNuj32YrsONkpOrH_83hgsRJtNlaBxWRPhirly8vGwO2ryQ0bs3EGh. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
BREUNIG, Robert Vicent; MENEZES, Fabio Marques. Empirical Approaches for Identifying Maverick Firms: an Application to Mortgage Providers in Australia. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Oxford University Press, v. 4, n. 3, p. 811-836, 2008. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1277771. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
BROMFIELD, Joseph Peter. Maverick Firms and Merger Policy. 2015. Thesis (Doctor of Philosophy) – Aston University, Birmingham, 2015. Available at: https://publications.aston.ac.uk/id/eprint/33329/1/Bromfield_J._2017.pdf. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
BROMFIELD, Joseph Peter; OLCZAK, Matthew. The Role of the Maverick Firm Concept in European Commission Merger Decisions. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Oxford University Press, v. 14, n. 2, p. 179-192, 2018. Available at: https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jcomle/v14y2018i2p179-192.html. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
BUDZINSKI, Oliver. Monoculture versus diversity in competition economics. Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, v. 32, n. 2, p. 295-324, mar. 2008. Available at: https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/cambje/v32y2008i2p295-324.html. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
CHRISTENSEN, Clayton M. The Innovator’s Dilemma - When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail. Cambrige: Harvard Business School Press, 1997.
DELUCA, Patrícia Serson. O Papel de Empresas Maverick no Controle de Concentrações Econômicas. Revista do IBRAC, v. 24, n. 2, p. 142-163, 2018. Disponível em: https://revista.ibrac.org.br/index.php/revista/article/view/156. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Case M.9461 - ABBVIE / ALLERGAN. Regulation (EC) n. 139/2004 Merger Procedure, Brussels, 10 jan. 2020, p. 1-59. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m9461_1187_3.pdf. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
FARRELL, Joseph; SHAPIRO, Carl. Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics - Policies and Perspectives, v. 10, n. 1, p. 1-41, 2010. Available at: https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/alternative.pdf. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
GILBERT, Richard J.; SUNSHINE, Steven C. Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets. Antitrust Law Journal, v. 63, n. 2, p. 569-601, 1995.
GILO, David; PORAT, Ariel. The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects. Michigan Law Review, v. 104, n. 5, p. 983-1031, 2006. Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol104/iss5/6. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
KATZ, Michael; SHELANSKI, Howard A. Mergers and Innovation. Antitrust Law Journal, Winter 2006, v. 75, n. 1, p. 1-85, 22 aug. 2006. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=894346. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
KERBER, Wolfgang. Competition, Innovation and Competition Law: Dissecting the Interplay. MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, n. 42, 2017. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3051103. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
KIM, Soo Jin; PARK, Yongjoon. Examining the Coordinated Effects of the AA/USAir Merger. 26 fev. 2024. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3877895. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
KOKKORIS, Ioannis; VALLETTI, Tommaso. Innovation Considerations in Horizontal Merger Control. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, v. 16, n. 2, p. 220-261, jun. 2020. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhaa008. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
LOERTSCHER, Simon; MARX, Leslie M. Coordinated Effects in Merger Review. The Journal of Law and Economics, v. 64, n. 4, article 3, p. 705-744, 2021. Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/jle/vol64/iss4/3. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
OWNINGS, Taylor M. Identifying a Maverick: When Antitrust Law Should Protect a Low-Cost Competitor. Vanderbilt Law Review, v. 66, n. 1, p. 323-354, 2013. Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol66/iss1/5/. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
SCHEFFMAN, David; COLEMAN, Mary. Quantitative Analyses of Potential Competitive Effects from a Merger. George Mason Law Review, v. 12, n. 2, p. 319-369, 9 jun. 2003. Available at: https://demotesturl.com/george-mason/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/12-2_Scheffman-Coleman.pdf. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
SCHUMPETER, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. 3rd ed. Harper Perennial Modern Thought, 2008.
SIDAK, J. Gregory; TEECE, David J. Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, v. 5, n. 4, p. 581-631, dec. 2009. Available at: https://academic.oup.com/jcle/article/5/4/581/755200. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
UNITED STATES. Department of Justice. In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Case 1:11-cv-01560-ESH Document 39 Filed 30 set. 2011, p. 1-35. Available at: https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/487726/download. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
UNITED STATES. U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 19 aug. 2010. Available at: https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
UNITED STATES. U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Merger Guidelines, 18 dec. 2023. Available at: https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-12/2023%20Merger%20Guidelines.pdf. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.
ZOU, Yanchi. A Method to Identify Maverick Firms: From the Perspective of Anti-Coordination Effects. Northeastern University, 11 apr. 2023. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=4415349. Access in: 4 dec. 2024.