O papel de empresas maverick no controle de concentrações econômicas
Barra lateral de artigos
Conteúdo do artigo principal
Resumo
A definição de empresas maverick é ainda incerta. O Guia H e diversos outros guias de autoridades antitruste trazem a possibilidade de flexibilização do método clássico de análise de concentrações quando se estiver diante de situações em que a mera avaliação da participação de mercado das partes não for capaz de capturar os reais efeitos concorrenciais da operação – por exemplo, na presença de um maverick. Na prática, o Cade tem analisado cada vez mais casos sob a perspectiva da potencial exclusão de um maverick e tem dedicado maior atenção aos critérios utilizados para a identificação de empresas desse tipo.
Downloads
Detalhes do artigo
Referências
ACCC – AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMMISSION. Merger Guidelines, 2008. Disponível em: https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Merger%20guidelines.pdf. Acesso em: 08/08/2018.
BAKER, Jonathan B. Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects under the Antitrust Laws. New York University Law Review. Vol. 77:135. Abril, 2002.
CADE – CONSELHO ADMINISTRATIVO DE DEFESA ECONÔMICA. Guia para Análise de Atos de Concentração Horizontal, 2016. Disponível em: http://www.cade.gov.br/acesso-a-informacao/publicacoesinstitucionais/guias_do_Cade/guia-para-analise-de-atos-de-concentracao-horizontal.pdf. Acesso em: 14/09/2018.
DoJ – U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. FTC – FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 2010. Disponível em: https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/mergerreview/100819hmg.pdf. Acesso em: 20/07/2018.
___________. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 1992. Disponível em: https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/hmg.pdf. Acesso em: 02/08/2018.
CANDIL, Ana Paula. Use of traditional methods to investigate new markets doesn’t work, CADE president says. Mlex, São Paulo, 18 de julho de 2018. Disponível em: http://www.mlex.com/GlobalAntitrust/DetailView.aspx?cid=1007354&siteid=193&rdir=1, acessado em 18/07/2018.
ENGEL, Christoph. OCKENFELS, Axel. Maverick – Making Sense of a Conjecture of Antitrust Policy in the Lab, Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn 2013/14. Agosto, 2013, edição revista em Janeiro, 2014.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Draft Commission Notice - Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 2005. Disponível em: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/draft_non-horizontal_mergers.pdf. Acesso em: 10/08/2018.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 2004. Disponível em: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004XC0205(02)&from=EN. Acesso em: 10/08/2018.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 2008. Disponível em: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008XC1018(03)&from=EN. Acesso em: 18/09/2018.
GINSBURG, Douglas.; WRIGHT, Joshua. Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust Institutions. Antitrust Law Journal, 78:1, 2011.
KATZ, Michael. SHELANSKY, Howard. Shumpeterian Competition and Antitrust Policy in High Tech Markets Competition, Vol. 14, p. 47, 2005.
LANG, Courtney D. The Maverick Theory: Creating Turbulence For Mergers. Saint Louis University Law Journal. Vol. 59:257. 2014.
OECD – ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. Disruptive Innovation and Competition Policy Enforcement – Background Note, 2015. Disponível em: http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF(2015)7&docLanguage=En. Acesso em: 02/08/2018.
OWINGS, Taylor M. Identifying a Maverick: When Antitrust Law Should Protect a Low-Cost Competitor. Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 66:1:323, 2013.
SCHEFFMAN, David T. COLEMAN, Mary. Quantitative Analyses of Potential Competitive Effects from a Merger. Junho, 2003.
SIDAK, Gregory. TEECE, David. Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 5(4), 581–631.