Poder de portfólio em concentrações econômicas preocupações e desdobramentos
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Este artigo pretende trazer um panorama geral da análise empreendida pelo Cade em atos de concentração que levantem preocupações relacionadas à criação de efeitos conglomerados e, principalmente, de poder de portfólio. Para tal, apresenta-se a teoria do dano que mais recorrentemente é empregada para justificar a análise das autoridades concorrenciais sobre estas estruturas empresariais em sede de controle de concentrações, e se indica que, dada esta aparente escolha de política de defesa da concorrência, é mais coerente que preocupações relacionadas a poder de portfólio sejam deixadas ao controle repressivo de condutas.
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