Measuring the tew antitrust revolution
Main Article Content
Abstract
For over four decades, Chicago School antitrust principles - centered on consumer welfare and the presumed efficiency of market behavior - have dominated U.S. antitrust policy. Recently, there has been a growing movement toward a new antitrust revolution inspired by Neo-Brandeisian ideals. This emerging framework advocates for multiple objectives, including the promotion of democracy, labor rights, and the protection of small businesses, alongside more assertive enforcement against anti-competitive practices. In this paper, I employ natural language processing to analyze the evolving beliefs and attitudes of American antitrust agencies - the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice - over time. My findings reveal a gradual shift in these agencies’ expressed views from Chicago School to Neo-Brandeisian thinking. However, as demonstrated through a political economy spatial model of strategic interaction, the antitrust agencies alone cannot drive this new revolution. To address this, I also
assess the beliefs of other key actors: the President, congressional committees, the Supreme Court, and business lobbying groups. While some of these actors have begun to embrace NeoBrandeisian perspectives, others have not, indicating that the full transition to a NeoBrandeisian antitrust policy may hinge on whether these resistant beliefs can be altered or overcome.
Downloads
Article Details
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
References
ASH, Elliot; CHEN, Daniel L.; NAIDU, Suresh. Ideas Have Consequences: The Impact of Law and Economics on American Justice. NBER Working Paper Series, n. 29788. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 22 nov. 2024. Disponível em: SSRN. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
AUER, Dirk; RADIC, Lazar. The Legacy of Neo-Brandeisianism: History of Footnote? Network Law Review, 9 jul. 2024. Disponível em: https://www.networklawreview.org/auerradic-brandeisianism/. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
BIDEN JR, Joseph R. The White House. Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy, 9 jul. 2021. Disponível em: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
BORK, Robert H. The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics. Antitrust Law Journal, v. 54, n. 1, p. 21-26, 1985. Disponível em: JSTOR. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
COX, Gary W.; MCCUBBINS, Matthew D. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. 2. ed. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
DELL, Melissa. Deep Learning for Economists. NBER Working Paper Series, n. 32768. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, ago. 2024. Disponível em: https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w32768/w32768.pdf. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT. Together with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers – Transmitted to Congress February, p. 328, 2016. Disponível em: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ERP-2016/pdf/ERP-2016.pdf. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
FORD, George S. Dissatisfaction at the Federal Trade Commission: An Empirical Analysis of Size and Source, 7 nov. 2022. Disponível em: SSRN. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
KHAN, Lina M. Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox. The Yale Law Journal, v. 126, n. 710, p. 710-805, 2017. Disponível em: https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/e.710.Khan.805_zuvfyyeh.pdf. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
KHAN, Lina M. The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, v. 9, n. 3, p. 131-132, mar. 2018. Disponível em: https://academic.oup.com/jeclap/article/9/3/131/4915966. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
KONKEL, Mark A.; SEIDENBERG, Alex J. Not Dead Yet: Noncompetes Survive, the FTC Rule Doesn’t (For Now). Kelley Drye, 9 jul. 2024. Disponível em: https://www.kelleydrye.com/viewpoints/blogs/labor-days/not-dead-yet-noncompetes-survive-the-ftc-rule-doesnt-for-now. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
KOVACIC, William E. Root and Branch Reconstruction: The Modern Transformation of US Antitrust Law and Policy? Antitrust, Chicago, v. 35, n. 3, p. 46-56, 31 jul. 2021. Disponível em: https://www.americanbar.org/groups/antitrust_law/resources/magazine/2021-summer/root-and-branch/. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
KOVACIC, William E.; WINERMAN, Marc. The Federal Trade Commission as an Independent Agency: Autonomy, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness. Iowa L. Rev., v. 100, n. 5, 15 maio 2015. Disponível em: https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/print/volume-100-issue-5/the-federal-trade-commission-as-an-independent-agency-autonomy-legitimacy-and-effectivenes. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
LANCIERI, Filippo; POSNER, Eric A.; ZINGALES, Luigi. The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States. NBER Working Paper Series, n. 30326. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, ago. 2022. Disponível em: https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w30326/w30326.pdf. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
QUIVER QUANTITATIVE. Corporate Lobbying Dashboard. Disponível em: https://www.quiverquant.com/lobbying/. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
SHAHSHAHANI, Sepehr; MCCARTY, Nolan. Testing Political Antitrust. New York University Law Review, v. 98, n. 1169, Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper, n. 4363447, 1.º nov. 2023. Disponível em: SSRN. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
SHAPIRO, Carl; SHELANSKI, Howard. Judicial Response to the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Review of Industrial Organization, v. 58, n. 1, p. 51-79, fev. 2021. Disponível em: https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/revind/v58y2021i1d10.1007_s11151-020-09802-x.html. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
SHAPIRO, Carl; YURUKOGLU, Ali. Trends in Competition in the United States: What Does the Evidence Show? NBER Working Paper Series, n. 32762. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, ago. 2024. Disponível em: https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w32762/w32762.pdf. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
UNITED STATES. Letter of resignation Christine S. Wilson (Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission), 2 mar. 2023. Disponível em: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/p180200wilsonresignationletter.pdf. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
WEINGAST, Barry R.; MORAN, Mark J. Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission. Journal of Political Economy, v. 91, n. 5, p. 765-800, out. 1983. Disponível em: ResearchGate. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.
WRIGHT, Joshua D. Overshot the Mark? A Simple Explanation of the Chicago School’s Influence on Antitrust, 31 mar. 2009. Competition Policy International, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper, n. 09-23. Disponível em: SSRN. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2024.