Mind the VGUPPI reflections about the implementation of v.GUPPI as first screening parameter for Vertical Mergers Acts submitted to Cade
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Abstract
This article reflects on the absence of an indicator of its own that can be used together with the market shares that today serve as the only metric for screening the Vertical Mergers Acts that will follow the summary procedure and those that, due to their
greater complexity and, consequently, with the greatest chances of producing anticompetitive effects, must follow the ordinary rite. The objective of the article is to present vGUPPI , a new metric that calculates agents' incentives to increase the prices of goods
and services to the detriment of their competitors. In view of the difficulties that verticalization imposes for antitrust authorities, it is considered that vGUPPI can become a viable alternative to sophisticate Cade’s antitrust analysis.
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References
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