Redefining dominance theories of harm and antitrust enforcement in digital platform markets
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Abstract
This article examines the role of dominant position and market power definitions in shaping effective theories of harm for digital markets. Drawing from the GS/ML v. Apple case in Brazil, it explores how Cade developed a qualitative and evidence-based approach to assess abuse of dominance in app distribution, payment systems, and digital content within the iOS ecosystem. The article then analyzes the limitations of traditional theories of harm and the challenges in operationalizing emerging ones - such as those based on data, innovation, ecosystems, and privacy. Finally, it argues that the control of anticompetitive conduct in digital platforms requires a structural shift in antitrust analysis, prioritizing multi-sided dynamics, network effects, and functional overlaps over conventional price and market share assessments,
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References
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