Competition policy evaluation through damage estimation in fuel retail cartel
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Este trabalho estima os danos causados pelo cartel nos postos de gasolina na regiao sul do Brasil usando tanto uma equacao reduzida quanto um modelo estrutural de demanda e oferta. Documentos do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica (CADE) ajudam a caracterizar os postos envolvidos na colusao nos mercados de etanol e gasolina. O objetivo é avaliar os efeitos da politica de concorrencia comparando o montante do dano estimado com as multas aplicadas.Em adicional, esse trabalho tambem
contribui para a literatura sobre substituicao de gasolina, uma vez que os dados apontam que o etanol é percebido como substituto perfeito e é preco inelastico. Os resultados mostram que houve um sobrecusto causado pelo cartel de ordem de 4.6% a 6.6% no mercado de gasolina e de ate 12% no mercado de etanol. As multas aplicadas, contudo, devem considerar a probabilidade de o cartel ser descoberto e, dada sua baixa probabilidade, as multas aplicadas no presente caso parecem estar alinhadas com esse objetivo.
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