Measuring the vital signs effects of concentration in the supplementary health care market on the average wages of professionals in the sector

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Published: Nov 2, 2023
Keywords:
supplementary health market, economic concentration, antitrust, labor market, differences in differences

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Paulo Henrique de Oliveira
Alian Damasceno Rodrigues
Matheus Monte Escobet
Jéssica de Araújo Silva Caieiro

Abstract

The empirical literature on the economic effects of horizontal and vertical concentrations in the labor market is still scarce in Brazil. In line with international studies on the subject, this paper seeks to estimate the effect of concentration in the market of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) on the wage of workers in the final activities of the Supplementary Health sector, a segment characterized by a movement toward concentration and verticalization that has become more pronounced in the last decade. To
this end, we estimated the concentration in the HMO market through the variation of the HHI index based on data from the National Agency of Supplementary Health (ANS) on the number of beneficiaries of health care plans in each Brazilian Registry of Corporate Taxpayers (CNPJ) root. The information about salaries and characteristics of individuals, in turn, comes from the Annual Social Information Report (RAIS). The sample of municipalities is composed of 3,586 cities. Through a difference-in-differences approach with multiple time periods, we estimated that concentrations negatively impact wages by 5.53%

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How to Cite
Oliveira, P. H. de, Rodrigues, A. D., Escobet, M. M., & Caieiro, J. de A. S. (2023). Measuring the vital signs: effects of concentration in the supplementary health care market on the average wages of professionals in the sector. Revista Do IBRAC, (1), 9–30. Retrieved from https://revista.ibrac.org.br/index.php/revista/article/view/6
Issue
No. 1 (2023)
Section
Artigos para Revista do IBRAC
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Author Biographies

Paulo Henrique de Oliveira

Economista na LCA Consultores. É graduado em Ciências Econômicas pela Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP) e mestrando em Economia e Política do Setor Público pela FGV-EAESP

Alian Damasceno Rodrigues

Economista na LCA Consultores. É graduado em Ciências Econômicas pela UFABC e mestrando em Estatística pela Unicamp

Matheus Monte Escobet

Economista na LCA Consultores. É graduado em Ciências Econômicas pela Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP) e mestrando em Políticas Públicas pelo Insper

Jéssica de Araújo Silva Caieiro

Economista na LCA Consultores. É graduada em Ciências Econômicas pela FEA-USP e pós-graduada em Ciência de Dados pelo Insper.

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