Além dos fundamentos jurídicos e microeconômicos um modelo de análise estrutural de julgamentos de atos de concentração
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Este estudo propõe um Modelo de Análise Estrutural de Julgamentos de Atos de Concentração, com o intuito de facilitar a compreensão e a previsibilidade, por agentes econômicos e pesquisadores, do fenômeno dos julgamentos antitruste. Adicionalmente, o referido modelo subsidia de informação os reguladores, com vistas à promoção da estabilidade de marcos
legais. Além da proposição teórica, um teste empírico de robustez é apresentado, utilizando-se de regressões de probabilidade Probit Ordenado e de um banco de dados próprio, que cobre catorze anos de regulacão antitruste no Brasil e contém 4.616 votos de 36 conselheiros do CADE sobre 775 Fusões e Aquisições.
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