Preços exploratórios: por uma nova teoria da decisão

Abstract

Brazilian competition law condemns economic behavior according to the extent of its ability to produce the typical effects of exploitative practices. This is all the more reason why the economic behavior that, directly, characterizes that exploitation (e.g.: the exploitative prices) is bound to be considered illicit. This dissertation intends to discuss the theory that ascribes technical and factual inefficacy to the exploitative prices prohibition, because of its conceptual, measuring and remedying difficulties. We seek to
demonstrate that there are enough theoretical indications that the formulation of a decision theory that recommends the implementation of the prohibition in specific cases can be beneficial to the public interest. Therefore, it is detrimental to the maximum effectiveness of the Constitution a generical and universal decision theory, which ascribes inefficacy to any kind of implementation of the prohibition of exploitative prices, rejecting the acknowledgment of each and every procedure regarding this practice.