Indústria de cartões de crédito, regulação e concorrência
Barra lateral de artigos
Conteúdo do artigo principal
Resumo
Seja pela forma de organização e poder de mercado dos agentes econômicos em cada ponta do mercado de cartõ es de pagamento (emissores e acquires), seja pelas externalidades e assimetrias de informação identificadas, a literatura sobre mercados de duas pontas sugere, entre outras relaçõ es, que (a) a estrutura de tarifas adotada nas duas pontas pode importar, tanto em termos
alocativos como de eficiência agregada; (b) a concentração de mercado entre emissores e credenciadores tem influência nos preços; (c) as barreiras à entrada variam significativamente em função do grau de integração das pontas em redes abertas; (d) as externalidades positivas entre os meios de pagamento e o segmento bancário criam grandes incentivos à integração de instituiçõ es bancárias às redes de pagamento eletrô nicas abertas já existentes; e (e) também, mas não apenas, em função da estrutura de colaboração necessária para atuar nesse mercado, a linha que separa exercício unilateral de poder de mercado da coordenação pró -competitiva é bastante tênue neste mercado.
Downloads
Detalhes do artigo
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Referências
ARDIZZI, G. Cost Efficiency in the Retail Payment Networks: First Evidence from the Italian Credit Card System. Texto para Discussão n. 480, Banca d’Italia, 2003.
BCB. Custo e Eficiência na Utilização de Instrumentos de Pagamento de Varejo. 2007. Disponível em: .
BCB. Diagnóstico do Sistema Brasileiro de Pagamentos de Varejo. 2006.
BIS. Core Principles for Systematically Important Payment Systems. Committee on Payment and Settlements System, 2005.
CHAKRAVORTI, S.; McHUGH, T. Why Do We Use So Many Checks? Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q III, 2002, p. 44-59.
CHAKRAVORTI, S.; ROSON, R. Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Payment Networks. Working Paper Series WP-04-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, revised, 2004.
CHANG, H. et al. An Assessment of The Reserve Bank of Australia’s Interchange Fee Regulation. Draft paper, 2005.
CIRASINO, M. et al. Reforming Payments and Securities Settlement Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean. The World Bank, 2006.
EIU. Government E-Payments Adoption Ranking, produced to Visa International, 2007.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Interim Report I – Payment Cards. Sector Inquiry under Article 17 Regulation 1/2003 on Retail Banking, 2006.
EVANS, D. Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-Sided Platform Industries. Review of Network Economics, vol. 2-3, 2003, p. 191-209.
EVANS, D.; SCHMALENSEE, R. Economic Aspects of Payment Card Systems and Antitrust Policy toward Joint Ventures. Antitrust Law Journal 63, 1995, p. 861-901.
EVANS, D.; SCHMALENSEE, R. The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms. NBER Working Paper 11603, Sep. 2005.
FARRELL, J. Efficiency and Competition between Payment Instruments. Review of Network Economics, vol. 5, issue 1, 2006.
GANS, J. S.; KING, S. P. The Role of Interchange Fees in Credit Card Associations: Competitive Analysis and Regulatory Issues. University of Melbourne, 2000.
GRESVIK, O.; ØWRE, G. Costs and Income in the Norwegian Payment System 2001. An Application of the Activity Based Costing Framework. Working Paper 2003/8, Norges Bank, 2003.
GUERIN-CALVERT, M.; ORDOVER, J. Merchant Benefits and Public Policy towards Interchange: An Economic Assessment. Review of Network Economics, vol. 4, issue 4, 2004.
HUMPHREY, D. et al. Cash, Paper, and Electronic Payments: A Cross-Country Analysis. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, nov. 1996, vol. 28, no. 4, p. 914.
ITM. The Abolition of the Non-discrimination Rule. Amsterdam, 2000.
INDÚSTRIA DE CARTÕES DE CRÉDITO, REGULAÇÃO E CONCORRÊNCIA. Revista do IBRAC, p. 109.
KATZ, M. L. Reform of Credit Card Schemes in Australia, commissioned report for the Reserve Bank of Australia, 2001.
KATZ, M. L. What Do We Know About Interchange Fees and What Does it Mean for Public Policy? Commentary on Evans and Schmalensee, 2005.
RYSMAN, M. Competition Between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages. Review of Economic Studies, vol. 71, issue 2, p. 483-512, abr. 2004.
KUMNICK. Os Modelos Internacionais de Acquiring – 4º Congresso de Cartões e Crédito ao Consumidor, 2005.
MOTTA, M. Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
ROCHET, J. C.; TIROLE, J. Cooperation among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations. The Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 22, no. 4, p. 549-570, 2002.
ROCHET, J. C.; TIROLE, J. An Economic Analysis of the Determination of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems. Review of Network Economics, vol. 2, jun. 2003.
ROCHET, J. C.; TIROLE, J. Two-Sided Markets: An Overview, mimeo, 2004.
ROCHET, J. C. What Do We Know About Interchange Fees and What Does it Mean for Public Policy? Commentary on Evans and Schmalensee, 2005.
SCHWARTZ, M.; VINCENT, D. The No-Surcharge Rule in Electronic Payments Markets: A Mitigation of Pricing Distortions. Mimeo, Georgetown University, 2000.
TIROLE, J. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988.
WEINBERG, J. The Organization of Private Payment Networks. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, vol. 83/2, 1997.
WRIGHT, J. The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems. University of Auckland, 2001.
POSNER, R. Theories of Economic Regulation. In: KUENNE, R. Readings in Social Welfare: Theory and Policy. 2000.