Bilateralismo coercitivo uma leitura geoeconômica da política comercial dos Estados Unidos e a posição do Brasil

Abstract

This article analyzes United States trade policy during Donald Trump’s second term (2025–2026), arguing that the tariffs imposed under successive legal bases and the bilateral trade arrangements concluded in the period constitute two faces of a single strategy, here termed coercive bilateralism, combining a transactional track and a coercive track. Drawing on a database of the arrangements concluded by the United States, crossreferenced with a reconstruction of the legal-normative architecture of its tariff policy, Brazil is treated as a singular yet not anomalous case: the one of lowest commercial rationality and highest political charge, in which only the coercive track was effectively activated. It shows that the trajectory of the measures directed at Brazil, from the 40% surcharge
under the IEEPA to the proposed 25% tariff under Section 301, confirms that the triggering justification remains, in origin, predominantly extracommercial. Examined through the lens of geoeconomics, the case exposes the coercive core that other arrangements tend to obscure and reveals significant implications for the multilateral trading system.