Danos em cartel, efeito repasse e as ações de reparação uma abordagem econômica
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O presente estudo visa contribuir no esclarecimento de conceitos econômicos e práticos para repaldar o cálculo de danos no âmbito de ações reparatórias em casos de cartéis. Aspectos econômicos da literatura antitruste e de organização industrial relacionados a danos de cartel são expostos, considerando os três principais itens: (i) sobrepreço ou aumento de custo (preço adicional cobrado pelo insumo/serviço cartelizado), (ii) repasse de parcela do sobrepreço aos consumidores indiretos (pass-on effect), e (iii) perda de quantidade vendida (output effect) e de que forma tais fatores devem ser considerados para um adequado cômputo do dano.
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