My game, my rules? Brazil’s and worldwide’ s antitrust experiences dealing with selfpreferencing

Article Sidebar

PDF (Português (Brasil))
Published: Nov 2, 2023
Keywords:
Self-preferencing, unilateral conducts, gatekeepers, symmetry, Cade

Main Article Content

Stephanie Vendemiatto Penereiro
Gustavo H. Kastrup
Vitor Jardim Machado Barbosa

Abstract

The paper analyzes the self-preferencing practice, which came into the spotlight with the rise of the digital economy. The authors analyze the case law from the main antitrust authorities worldwide (the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union) in comparison with the Brazilian competition authority’s precedents to understand if there is a robust, straightforward theory of harm universally accepted for cases involving the self-preferencing offense. More than that, the paper aims to point out where Brazil is within the discussion about how to address self-preferencing cases.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Article Details

How to Cite
Penereiro, S. V., Kastrup, G. . H., & Barbosa, V. J. M. (2023). My game, my rules? Brazil’s and worldwide’ s antitrust experiences dealing with selfpreferencing. Revista Do IBRAC, (1), 59–86. Retrieved from https://revista.ibrac.org.br/index.php/revista/article/view/4
Issue
No. 1 (2023)
Section
Artigos para Revista do IBRAC
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Author Biographies

Stephanie Vendemiatto Penereiro

Bacharela em direito pela Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo (2017). Mestre em direito pela Universidade de Brasília (2022). Doutoranda em direito pela Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo. Foi chefe de assessoria de Conselheiro do Tribunal do CADE. Atualmente, atua como advogada na equipe de Direito da Concorrência do Lefosse Advogados

Gustavo H. Kastrup

Bacharel em direito pela Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo (2017). Doutorando em direito pela Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo. LL.M. Candidate pela Penn Carey Law School da University of Pennsylvania.

Vitor Jardim Machado Barbosa

Bacharel em direito pela Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo (2015). Non-Governmental Advisor da International Competition Network. Mestrando em direito pela Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa. Atualmente, atua como advogado na equipe de Direito da Concorrência do Stocche Forbes Advogados

References

ANDRIYCHUCK, Oles. Shifting the digital paradigm: Towards a sui generis competition policy. Computer Law & Security Review, v. 46, 2022. Disponível em: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2022.105733. Acesso em: 5 set. 2022.

CNN. Google apela ao mais alto tribunal da UE por multa antitruste de US$ 2,7 bilhões. 20 jan. 2022. Disponível em: https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/business/google-apela-ao-mais-alto-tribunal-da-ue-por-multaantitruste-de-us-27-bi/. Acesso em: 8 set. 2022

COLOMO, Pablo Ibáñez. Indispensability and Abuse of Dominance: From Commercial Solvents to Slovak Telekom and Google Shopping. journal of European Competition Law & Practice, v. 10, n. 9, 2019, p. 532. Disponível em: https://papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3502519. Acesso em: 8 set. 2022.

COLOMO. Self-preferencing: yet another epithet in need of limiting principles. In: World Competition, v. 43, n. 4. Disponível em: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3654083. Acesso em: 8 set. 2022.

COMISSÃO EUROPEIA. Anti-trust: Comissão multa a Google em 2,42 mil milhões de euros por abuso de posição dominante no mercado de motor de busca, ao dar uma vantage illegal ao seu próprio serviço de comparação de preços. Press release. 27 jun. 2017. Disponível em: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/pt/IP_17_1784. Acesso em: 8 set. 2022.

COMISSÃO EUROPEIA. Antitrust: Commission probes allegations of antitrust violations by Google. Press release. 30 nov. 2020. Disponível em: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_10_1624. Acesso em: 8 set. 2022.

COMISSÃO EUROPEIA. Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Amazon for the use of non-public independent seller data and opens second investigation into its e-commerce business practices. Press release. 10 nov. 2020. Disponível em: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/ip_20_2077. Acesso em: 8 set. 2022.

COMISSÃO EUROPEIA. Caso AT.39740: Google Search (Shopping), 2017. Resumo da decisão. Disponível em: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018XC0112(01)&from=EN. Acesso em: 4 set. 2022.

COMPETITION MARKETS AUTHORITY. CMA to investigate Google’s ‘Privacy Sandbox’ browser changes. Press release. Disponível em:

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-to-investigate-google-s-privacy-sandbox-browser-changes. Acesso em: 1 set. 2022.

COMPETITION MARKETS AUTHORITY. Decision to accept commitments offered by Google in relation to its Privacy Sandbox Proposals. Case number 50972. Disponível em: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62052c52e90e077f7881c975/Google_Sandbox_.pdf. Acesso em: 1 set. 2022.

COMPETITION MARKETS AUTHORITY. Investigation into Google’s ‘Privacy Sandbox’ browser changes. 2022b. Disponível em: https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/investigation-intogoogles-privacy-sandbox-browser-changes. Acesso em: 1 set. 2022.

CONSELHO ADMINISTRATIVO DE DEFESA ECONÔMICA. Ato de Concentração nº 08700.000627/2020-37. Grupo SBF S.A e Nike do Brasil

Comércio e Participações Ltda. Terceira interessada: NS2.COM Internet S.A. Relator Conselheiro Luis Henrique Bertolino Braido. Julgado em: 4 nov. 2020. Publicado no Diário Oficial da União em: 11 nov. 2020.

CONSELHO ADMINISTRATIVO DE DEFESA ECONÔMICA. Ato de Concentração nº 08700.003959/2022-35. Rede D'Or São Luiz S.A., Sul América S.A.

CONSELHO ADMINISTRATIVO DE DEFESA ECONÔMICA. Ato de Concentração nº 08700.007341/2021-63. CMA CGM S.A. e Maersk A/S. Terceira interessada: Associação Brasileira dos Terminais Portuários – ABTP. Julgado em: 22 jun. 2022. Publicado no Diário Oficial da União em: 23 jun. 2022.

CONSELHO ADMINISTRATIVO DE DEFESA ECONÔMICA. Inquérito Administrativo nº 08700.001797/2022-09. Representante: Associação Brasileira das Empresas de Benefícios ao Trabalhador – ABBT. Representada: iFood.com Agência de Restaurantes Online S.A.

CONSELHO ADMINISTRATIVO DE DEFESA ECONÔMICA. Processo Administrativo nº 08012.010483/2011-94. Representante: E-Commerce Media Group Informação e Tecnologia Ltda. Representadas: Google Inc. e Google Brasil Internet Ltda. Relator Conselheiro Mauricio Oscar Bandeira Maia. Julgado em: 26 jun. 2019. Publicado no Diário Oficial da União em: 2 jul. 2019.

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. United States of America et al. v. Google LLC, Docket Nº 1:20-cv-03010.

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc. – Docket Nº 4:20-cv-05640-YGR.

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. Rumble, Inc. v. Google LLC, Docket Nº 21-cv-00229-HSG.

FERNANDES, Victor Oliveira. Direito da Concorrência das Plataformas Digitais: Entre abuso de poder econômico e inovação. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2022.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. Google Agrees to Change its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns In the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search. 3 jan. 2013. Disponível em: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftccompetition-concerns-markets-devices-smart. Acesso em: 4 set. 2022.

HOVENKAMP, Eric. Proposed Antitrust Reforms In: Big Tech: What do They Imply for Competition and Innovation? 2022. SSRN. Disponível em: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4127334. Acesso em: 4 set. 2022.

HOVENKAMP, Herbert. Monopolizing and the Sherman Act. In: Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law, 2769, 2022. Disponível em: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3772&context=faculty_scholarship. Acesso em: 4 set. 2022.

HOFFMAN, Bruce et al. O Perigo estará nos detalhes, JOTA. 12 jul. 2022. Disponível em: https://www.jota.info/opiniao-e-analise/artigos/o-perigoestara-nos-detalhes-12072022. Acesso em: 8 set. 2022.

KIRA, Beatriz; COUTINHO, Diogo. Ajustando as lentes: novas teorias do dano para mercados digitais. Revista de Defesa da Concorrência, v. 9, n. 1, 2021, p. 91.

O’LOUGHLIN, Peter. Cognitive Foreclosure. Georgia State University Law Review, v. 38, n. 4, 2022, p. 1097-1178.

OHIO STATE, COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DO CONDADO DE DELAWARE. State ex rel. Yost v. Google LLC, Docket Nº 21-CV-H-06-0274.

ORGANIZAÇÃO PARA COOPERAÇÃO E DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONÔMICO. Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets. 2020, p. 54-55. Disponível em: https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/abuse-of-dominance-in-digital-markets-2020.pdf. Acesso em: 8 set. 2022.

FTC digs in on Amazon’s iRobot deal. POLITICO,2 set. 2022. Disponível em: https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/02/amazons-ftc-problemkeeps-growing-with-irobot-one-medical-probes-00054749 . Acesso em: 4 set. 2022.

SOUSA, Pedro Caro de. What shall we do about self-preferencing? Competition Policy International, 24 jun. 2020. Disponível em: https://bit.ly/3w3mxiL. Acesso em: 8 set. 2022.

UNITED STATES. Senate Judiciary Committee. Testimony of Sally Hubbard on Competition in Digital Technology Markets: Examining Self-preferencing by Digital Platforms. Disponível em: https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hubbard%20Testimony.pdf. Acesso em: 4 set. 2022.

UNITED STATES. Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committeee on The Judiciary. Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets: Majority Staff Report and Recommendations. Disponível em: https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf?utm_campaign=4493-519 . Acesso em: 4 set. 2022.

UNITED STATES. The White House. Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy. 9 Jul. 2021. Disponível em: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/. Acesso em: 4 set. 2022.

TRIBUNAL GERAL DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA. Press Release nº 197/21: The General Court largely dismisses Google’s action against the decision of the Commission finding that Google abused its dominant position by favouring its own comparison shopping service over competing comparison services. 10 nov. 2021. Disponível em: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2021-11/cp210197en.pdf. Acesso em: 8 set. 2022.