A concorrência dinâmica das plataformas digitais o respeito à inovação sem desprestigiar a preservação da competição na economia digital – reflexões a partir do caso “Google Shopping”
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O artigo discute como deve ser promovida a defesa da concorrência em conciliação com o processo de inovação tecnológica no
âmbito da concorrência dinâmica das plataformas digitais, valendo-se, para tanto, de considerações suscitadas a partir da análise do julgamento do caso “Google Shopping”, concluído pelo Conselho Administrativo de Defesa da Concorrência (Cade) em junho de 2019. São feitas considerações gerais sobre os desafios trazidos pelas plataformas digitais e pela forma de aplicação diferenciada do antitruste nesse meio, segundo a perspectiva schumpeteriana, a fim de ressaltar a importância da conciliação entre o antitruste e a inovação. Ao analisar o julgamento do caso “Google Shopping”, conclui-se que o Cade adotou postura excessiva de retração para evitar incorrer em erro de tipo I e assim não prejudicar a inovação. Concluise, contudo, que essa postura pode não ser a mais adequada para a proteção da concorrência na economia digital, legitimando inovações com propósitos exclusionários.
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