Restrições verticais efeitos anticompetitivos e eficiências
Barra lateral de artigos
Conteúdo do artigo principal
Resumo
Neste artigo, será realizada uma breve revisão da literatura econômica sobre práticas restritivas verticais, bem como de determinados aspectos operacionais e legais no âmbito da legislação brasileira de defesa da concorrência. A principal conclusão é a de que a ausência de competição intermarca significativa – ou seja, de competição entre cadeias verticais (produtores/distribuidores) que produzem e comercializam marcas diferentes dentro de um dado mercado relevante - implica elevada probabilidade de que as restrições verticais efetivadas por uma empresa com forte posição dominante gerem efeitos anticompetitivos líquidos. Embora não seja mencionada diretamente, deve-se notar que a integração vertical produz efeitos- tanto os anticompetitivos, como aqueles identificados como eficiências econômicas – basicamente idênticos aos observados no caso das restrições verticais.
Downloads
Detalhes do artigo
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Referências
Aghion, P.; Bolton, P. Contracts as Barriers to Entry. American Economic Review, v. 77, p. 388–401, 1987.
Areeda, Phillip; Hovenkamp, Herbert. Fundamentals of Antitrust Law. Vol. 2. New York: Aspen Law and Business, 2002.
Bernheim, B. Douglas; Whinston, Michael. Exclusive Dealing. Journal of Political Economy, v. 106, n. 1, p. 64-103, 1998.
Besanko, David; Perry, Martin. Equilibrium Incentives for Exclusive Dealing in a Differentiated Products Oligopoly. RAND Journal of Economics, v. 24, n. 4, p. 646-667, 1993.
Bonanno, Giacomo; Vickers, John. Vertical Separation. Journal of Industrial Economics, v. 36, p. 257-265, 1988.
Bork, Robert. The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself. New York: Basic Books, 1978.
Burstein, Martin L. The Economics of Tie-In Sales. Review of Economics and Statistics, v. 42, p. 68-73, 1960.
Caillaud, Bernard; Rey, Patrick. Strategic Aspects of Vertical Delegation. European Economic Review, v. 39, n. 3-4, p. 421-431, 1995.
Carlton, Dennis; Waldman, Michael. The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries. NBER Working Paper, n. 6831, dez. 1998.
Carlton, Dennis; Waldman, Michael. The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries. RAND Journal of Economics, v. 33, p. 194-220, 2002.
Carlton, D.; Perloff, J. Modern Industrial Organization. 2. ed. New York: Harper Collins, 1994. cap. 20.
Chipty, Tasneem. Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare. American Economic Review, v. 91, n. 3, p. 428-453, 2001.
Chen, Z.; Ross, T. Refusals to Deal, Price Discrimination, and Independent Service Organization. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, v. 2, p. 593–614, 1993.
Comanor, W.S.; Frech, H.E. The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements. American Economic Review, v. 75, p. 539-546, 1985.
Fagundes, J. Fundamentos Econômicos das Políticas de Defesa da Concorrência. São Paulo: Ed. Singular, 2003.
Fagundes, J. Os Objetivos das Políticas de Defesa da Concorrência: a Escola de Harvard e a Escola de Chicago. Revista do IBRAC, v. 10, n. 3, dez. 2003a.
Fagundes, J. Eficiência Econômica e Distribuição de Renda em Análises Antitruste: O Modelo do Price Standard. Revista do IBRAC, v. 10, n. 5, dez. 2003b.
Greenhut, M.L.; Ohta, H. Vertical Integrations of Successive Oligopolists. American Economic Review, v. 69, p. 137–141, 1979.
Hart, Oliver; Tirole, Jean. Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Microeconomics Issue), p. 205-286, 1990.
Hausman, Jerry; Leonard, Gregory; Zona, J. Douglas. Competitive Analysis with Differentiated Products. Annales D’Economie et Statistique, v. 34, p. 159-180, 1994.
Jordan, John; Jaffe, Bruce. The Use of Exclusive Territories in the Distribution of Beer: Theoretical and Empirical Observations. The Antitrust Bulletin, v. 32, n. 1, p. 137-164, 1987.
Jullien, B.; Rey, P. Resale Price Maintenance and Collusion. Mimeografado, University of Toulouse, 2002.
Klein, Benjamin; Murphy, Kevin. Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms. Journal of Law and Economics, v. 31, n. 4, p. 265-297, 1988.
Krattenmaker, T.; Salop, S.C. Anti-competitive Exclusion: Raising Rival’s Costs to Achieve Power over Price. Yale Law Journal, v. 96, p. 209–293, 1986.
Marvel, H.; McCafferty, S. Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification. RAND Journal of Economics, v. 15, p. 340–359, 1984.
Marvel, H. Exclusive Dealing. Journal of Law & Economics, v. 25, p. 1-25, 1982.
Mathewson, G.F.; Winter, R.A. The Economics of Vertical Restraints in Distribution. In: Stiglitz, J.; Mathewson, G. New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure. London: Macmillan, 1986.
Mathewson, G.F.; Winter, R.A. The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment. American Economic Review, v. 77, p. 1057-1062, 1987.
Matsura, E.; Mello, M. Estudo I.3.2: Restrições Verticais. In: Seminário Estudos em Métodos Quantitativos Aplicados à Defesa da Concorrência e Regulação Econômica. Brasília: SDE, 2005.
Motta, M. Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Meese, A. J. Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints. Cornell Law Review, v. 89, p. 553–620, 2004.
Nalebuff, Barry. Bundling as an Entry Barrier. Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. 159, p. 159-187, fev. 2004.
Ornstein, Stanley. Exclusive Dealing and Antitrust. The Antitrust Bulletin, v. 34, p. 65-98, 1989.
Perry, M. Forward Integration by Alcoa: 1888-1930. Journal of Industrial Economics, v. 29, p. 37–53, 1980.
Posner, R. Antitrust Law – An Economic Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.
Rasmusen, Eric; Ramseyer, J. Mark; Wiley Jr., John. Naked Exclusion. American Economic Review, v. 81, n. 5, p. 1137-1145, 1991.
Reiffen, David. Partial Ownership and Foreclosure: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Regulatory Economics, v. 12, p. 227-244, 1998.
Rey, P.; Tirole, J. The Logic of Vertical Restraints. American Economic Review, v. 76, p. 921-939, 1986a.
Rey, P.; Tirole, J. Vertical Restraints from a Principal-Agent Viewpoint. In: Pellegrini, L.; Reddy, S.K. Marketing Channels: Relationships and Performance. Lexington: Lexington Books, p. 3-30, 1986b.
Salinger, Michael A. Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure. Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. 103, p. 345-356, 1988.
Salop, Steven C.; Scheffman, David T. Cost Raising Strategies. Journal of Industrial Economics, v. 36, p. 19-34, 1987.
Salop, Steven; Scheffman, David. Rising Rivals Costs. American Economic Review, v. 73, n. 2, p. 267-271, 1983.
Sass, Tim. The Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing: Evidence from the US Beer Industry. Mimeografado, Florida State University, 2002.
Sass, Tim; Saurman, David. Efficiency Effects of Exclusive Territories: Evidence from the Indiana Beer Market. Economic Inquiry, v. 34, n. 3, p. 597-615, 1996.
Segal, Ilya; Whinston, Michael. Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments. RAND Journal of Economics, v. 31, n. 4, p. 603-633, 2000.
Schwartz, M. The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment. American Economic Review, v. 77, p. 1063-1068, 1987.
Scherer, F. M.; Ross, D. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. 3. ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990.
Shaffer, G. Capturing Strategic Rent: Full-Line Forcing, Brand Discounts, Aggregate Rebates, and Maximum Resale Price Maintenance. Journal of Industrial Economics, v. 39, p. 557-575, 1991.
Shaffer, G. Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices. RAND Journal of Economics, v. 22, p. 120-135, 1991.
Spengler, Joseph J. Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy. Journal of Political Economy, v. 58, p. 347-352, 1950.
Spencer, A. M. Monopoly, Quality and Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics, v. 6, p. 417-429, 1975.
Tan, G. The Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints. Relatório preparado para o Competition Bureau, Canada, 2001.
Vickers, John. Abuse of Market Power. Office of Fair Trading Working Paper, 2004.
Grimes, Warren S. Spiff, Polish and Consumer Demand Quality: Vertical Price Restraints Revisited. California Law Review, v. 80, p. 815-836, 1992.
Whinston, Michael D. Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion. American Economic Review, v. 80, p. 837-859, 1990.