A compressão de margens na fronteira do direito concorrencial .
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O trabalho versa sobre a “compressão de margens”. Analisam-se as construções jurisprudenciais estadunidense e europeia sobre o tema, para evidenciar como a divergência entre elas é derivada de diferentes perspectivas sobre a finalidade do antitruste. Discute-se, então, o reflexo da discussão para o direito brasileiro: a jurisprudência do CADE não manifesta adesão às teorias europeia ou estadunidense; ao mesmo tempo, não é possível observar uma abordagem brasileira coerente sobre o tema. A concepção da compressão de margens como conduta autônoma e o teste do “concorrente igualmente eficiente” podem constituir pontos de partida adequados à jurisprudência nacional.
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