Análise do controle de estruturas em mercados digitais nos EUA (2015-2020)

Conteúdo do artigo principal

Paulo Henrique de Oliveira
Matheus Monte Escobet

Resumo

“Nos últimos anos, a ascensão de grandes plataformas digitais tem suscitado discussões em distintas jurisdições acerca do papel da política de defesa da concorrência em mercados digitais. Tais reflexões, a despeito de originadas em torno das grandes empresas de tecnologia, não se circunscrevem a estas, abarcando uma série de segmentos paulatinamente transformados pela digitalização da economia. O presente artigo busca, à luz da experiência da jurisprudência norte-americana no controle de estruturas e da literatura sobre concorrência em mercados digitais, explorar os reflexos dessas discussões no escrutínio das autoridades concorrenciais do país em casos envolvendo mercados digitais entre os anos de 2015 e 2020”.

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Henrique de Oliveira, P., & Monte Escobet, M. (2023). Análise do controle de estruturas em mercados digitais nos EUA (2015-2020). Revista Do IBRAC, (1), 261–282. Recuperado de https://revista.ibrac.org.br/index.php/revista/article/view/13
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Artigos para Revista do IBRAC
Biografia do Autor

Paulo Henrique de Oliveira

Economista na LCA Consultores. É graduado em Ciências Econômicas pela Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP) e mestrando em Economia e Política do Setor Público pela FGV-EAESP.

Matheus Monte Escobet

Economista na LCA Consultores. É graduado em Ciências Econômicas pela Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP) e mestrando em Políticas Públicas pelo Insper.

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